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Is the Traditional Method of Regulation (the Legislative Act) 
Suffi  cient to Regulate Artifi cial Intelligence, or Should It Also 
Be Regulated by an Algorithmic Code?
Abstract: Th e issue of the regulation of artifi cial intelligence (AI) is one of the signifi cant challenges 
faced by the EU at present. Most researchers focus on the substantive scope of AI regulation, including 
state law, ethical norms and soft  law. In addition to the substantive and legal scope of the regulation, it is 
worthwhile considering the manner of such regulation.1 Since AI is an algorithmic code, it seems correct 
to regulate (restrict) AI not so much with traditional law established in natural (human) language as 
with one implemented into algorithms. Th ey may operate as a tool supporting traditional legislation 
(RegTech), but it is possible to go further with the issue and create regulation algorithms which 
implement the law as the eff ective law. However, this requires a new approach to law and legislation – the 
law as algorithmic code. 
Keywords: AI, AI ecosystem, AI regulation, Algorithm, law as IT code, RegTech, LegalTech 
1 In an earlier publication, the author referred to smart contracts as a method of regulation: 
D.  Szostek, Sztuczna inteligencja a kody. Czy rozwiązaniem dla uregulowania sztucznej 
inteligencji jest smart contract i blockchain? (in:) L.  Lai and M.  Świerczyński (eds.), Prawo 
Sztucznej Inteligencji, Warsaw 2020, p. 15ff . Th is article is an extension of the original idea.
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Introduction
Both the documents2 and the statements of science3 and practice refer to the 
signifi cance of the development of a digital economy based on artifi cial intelligence 
(AI), with simultaneous identifi cation of the risks and dangers related thereto.4 
AI is a challenge to economies, states and contemporary law and the manner of 
its application.5 One of the recurring issues in the scientifi c discussion is artifi cial 
intelligence regulation.6 Th e question is not only about the issue of the scope of the 
subject matter of the regulation7 but also the manner of regulation. Th e traditional 
2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on 
Artifi cial Intelligence for Europe, Brussels (COM(2018) 237), 25.04.2018, https://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM% 3A2018%3A237%3AFIN; Th e High-Level Expert Group 
on Artifi cial Intelligence European Commission Directorate-General for Communications 
Networks Technology, 20.09.2018; Recommendation No. 2102 (2017) about technological 
convergence, artifi cial intelligence and human rights (Doc. 14432); Declaration by the Committee 
of Ministers on the manipulative capabilities of algorithmic processes, 13.02.2019,; European 
Commission For Th e Effi  ciency Of Justice, European Ethical Charter on the use of artifi cial 
intelligence in judicial systems, Guidelines on Artifi cial Intelligence and Data Protection 
T-PD(2019)01, 14.04.2021,. 
3 N.D. Wright (ed.), Artifi cial Intelligence, China, Russia, and the Global Order, Maxwell 2019, p. 
2ff .; S. Feldstein, Th e Global Expansion and AI Surveillance, Washington 2019, p. 5ff . See also 
National AI Strategies. 
4 Australian Government, Artificial Intelligence: Solving problems, growing the economy 
and improving our quality of life, 20.12.2019, https://data61.csiro.au/en/Our-Research/
Our-Work/AI-Roadmap; Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2016–
2019 Progress report: Advancing artificial intelligence R&D (November 2019), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/AI-Research-and-Development-
Progress-Report-2016–2019.pdf (accessed 09.04.2021); National Artificial Intelligence 
Strategy of the Czech Republic, https://www.mpo.cz/assets/en/guidepost/for-the-media/
press-releases/2019/5/NAIS_eng_web.pdf (accessed 14.04.2021); EU guidelines on ethics 
in artificial intelligence: Context and implementation, https://www.europarl.europa.
eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/640163/EPRS_BRI(2019)640163_EN.pdf (accessed 
31.03.2021); Responsibility and AI: Council of Europe study, 21.12.2019, https://rm.coe.int/ 
responsability-and-ai-en/168097d9c5. 
5 European Artifi cial Intelligence (AI) leadership, the path for an integrated vision https://nws.
eurocities.eu/MediaShell/media/European_AI_study.pdf (accessed 20.04.2021). 
6 White Paper On Artifi cial Intelligence. A European approach to excellence and trust, COM(2020) 
65 fi nal, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/fi les/commission-white-
paper-artifi cial-intelligence-feb2020_en.pdf (19.04.2019).
7 I suggest reading interesting recommendations concerning liability issued by EU experts: Liability 
for Artifi cial Intelligence and other emerging digital technologies: Report from the Expert 
Group on Liability and New Technologies – New Technologies Formation, https://ec.europa.eu/
transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do= groupDetail.groupMeetingDoc&docid=36608 (accessed 
12.04.2021).
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method of AI regulation is necessary but seems to be insuffi  cient.8 Increasingly oft en, 
modern law applies the tools of LegalTech9 and RegTech10 to support the processes 
of the analysis or application and even enforcement of law.11 In reality, regulating 
AI only with the text of a legal act is so complicated that it is very diffi  cult, if not 
impossible, to reach it through a traditional way of lawmaking. At the most, it may 
be a way of imposing rights and obligations that will have to be taken into account 
on the entities teaching or using AI in the process of AI coding or teaching, and thus 
fi nally eff ecting the transformation of law into codes. 
Th erefore, it is necessary to formulate the following hypothesis: Since AI is 
an algorithm, then the method of its regulation should be the use of an algorithm 
comprising legal standards. Th e question is, Should such an algorithm be a RegTech 
tool supporting traditional legislation, or should it be the law incorporated into the 
code? Who should create and enforce such algorithms? Should it remain the domain 
of private entities that use or teach AI, or the domain of states or maybe of the 
European Union? And who is to control the AI-regulating algorithms and ensure 
their cybersecurity? 
It is not possible to include all the regulation aspects of AI in such a short 
publication. Th e issue requires separate and in-depth scientifi c research and a separate 
monograph.12 Th e goal of this article is to prove that the hypothesis formulated 
above is correct and to answer the above questions. At the least, the article is just 
a contribution to the discussion of AI regulation. Th e author deliberately passes 
over the issue of the substantive layer13 of AI regulation and concentrates on the 
8 https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupMeetingDoc
&docid=36608 (accessed 20.04.2021).
9 Th e goal of this article is not the analysis of the defi nition of LegalTech or RegTech. For more, see 
M. Hartung, M. Bues and G. Halblieb, Legal Tech, Baden-Baden 2018, p. 11ff . 
10 Compare the issue of the term and application of RegTech in T.  Kerikmäe (ed.) Regulating 
eTechnologies in the European Union. Normative Realities and Trends, Cham 2014, p. 7ff . See 
also Recommendations on regulation, innovation and fi nance: Final Report to the European 
Commission, 01.12.2019, p. 27ff ., https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/fi les/business_economy_
euro/banking_and_finance/documents/191113-report-expert-group-regulatory-obstacles-
fi nancial-innovation_en.pdf. Th e analysis of the scope of the terms of LegalTech and RegTech 
exceeds the scope of this article. 
11 R. Leens, Regulating New Technologies in Times of Change, (in:) L. Reins (ed.), Regulating New 
Technologies in Uncertain Times, Cham 2019, pp. 3–19; D. Szostek (ed.), Legal Tech. Czyli jak 
bezpiecznie korzystać z narzędzi informatycznych w organizacji, w tym w kancelarii oraz dziale 
prawnym, Warsaw 2021, p. 3ff .
12 See: D.E. Harasimiuk and T. Braun, Regulating Artifi cial Intelligence. Binary Ethics and the Law, 
London/ New York 2021, p. 1ff .
13 Compare: On factual regulation: Documents of the European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/
info/sites/info/fi les/commission-white-paper-artifi cial-intelligence-feb2020_en.pdf; M.  Chinen, 
Law and Autonomous Machines, Cheltenham 2019, p. 2ff .; J. Turner, Robot Rules. Regulating 
Artifi cial Intelligence, Cham 2019, p. 133ff ., where the author specifi es diff erent law aspects 
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analysis of whether it is suffi  cient for the correct AI regulation to have traditional 
legal provisions created and published in a natural language or whether an algorithm 
should be applied (we can call it the regulation algorithm) which implements the said 
provisions within its scope. If so, then whoever creates and controls it, and whether it 
should be something like a RegTech tool supporting traditional regulation or whether 
as code, it should become the eff ective law. 
Th e terms AI, codes or algorithms bring a lot of doubt in the scholarship, 
deepened by the European Commission’s proposed Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on artifi cial intelligence 
and amending certain union legislative acts (the AI Act),14 where (in the annexe) AI is 
very broadly defi ned to include not only self-learning algorithms, but, more broadly, 
expert systems as well. International legal scholarship distinguishes three types 
of AI – algorithms, expert systems and machine learning.15 Th is concept is highly 
underdefi ned, as is the defi nition of an algorithm, which can take various forms. It 
also has no uniform defi nition.16 Th e problem of defi nition alone is very broad and 
lends itself to separate studies much broader than the framework of a single article. 
Th e aim of this publication is the question of the method of regulation and not its 
scope or the solution of defi nition problems. Th erefore, for its purposes, some 
simplifi cations are assumed without going into conceptual issues.17 Th e following 
considerations concern the so-called self-learning algorithms (for the purposes of 
this article included under the general term AI).
for AI, both orders and prohibitions in relation to human rights or individual law systems, but 
also thinks of the law only and exclusively for AI, similar to how we have rights for animals. 
Examples of material solutions are: Report with recommendations to the Commission on a civil 
liability regime for artifi cial intelligence (2020/2014(INL)), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/
doceo/document/A-9–2020-0178_EN.html (accessed 20.04.2021); Artifi cial Intelligence (AI): 
new developments and innovations applied to e-commerce, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/
thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL_IDA(2020)648791 (accessed 20.04.2021). 
14 Proposal For A Regulation Of Th e European Parliament And Of Th e Council Laying Down 
Harmonised Rules On Artifi cial Intelligence (Artifi cial Intelligence Act) And Amending Certain 
Union Legislative Acts Com/2021/206 Final, https://Eur-Lex.Europa.Eu/Legal-Content/EN/
TXT/?Uri=CELEX:52021PC0206 (accessed 19.07.2021).
15 W. Barfi eld and U. Pagallo, Law and AI, Cheltenham/Northampton 2020, pp. 19–23; R. Prabucki, 
D. Szostek and J. Wyczik, Prawo jako kod, (in:) D. Szostek (ed.), Legal Tech, op. cit., p. 21.
16 Ibidem, p. 17ff ., and the literature cited therein.
17 In Polish scholarship, compare: A.  Krasuski, Status sztucznego agenta. Podstawy prawne 
zastosowania sztucznej inteligencji, Warsaw 2021, p. 3 ff .; L.  Lai and M.  Świerczyński (eds.), 
Prawo Sztucznej Inteligencji, op. cit., p. 1ff . 
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1. Incorporation of Law into Codes
Artifi cial intelligence is a specifi c algorithm which may itself take decisions 
independently and ‘learns’ in closed or open ecosystems.18 AI is characterised by 
variability, activity and the ability to interpret the collected structured or unstructured 
data, to draw conclusions from the knowledge obtained from data and to select the 
best actions to achieve the goal. In other words, AI is able to learn.19 Th e regulation 
concerning restrictions for AI should take this characteristic into account. In other 
words, while learning, AI should take into account the restrictions (that is, the law) 
imposed on it.20 AI does not have any possibility to consider the restrictions of law 
published in natural language in traditional legislation. Yet it would be possible if the 
law concerning AI was implemented into algorithmic codes.21 
L.  Lessig’s concept22 that code is law and the legal system is composed of 
‘puzzles’ which can be combined with one another and formed in cyberspace, among 
others, has become the reality nowadays. It is no longer a theoretical concept but 
has the form of actually implemented projects where the human language – used 
thus far to notify the legal rules to be observed by the society – is replaced with the 
programming codes readable by machines equipped with processors and directly 
18 More about the defi nition and characteristics of AI can be found in J. McCarthy, M. L. Minsky, 
N. Rochester and C.E. Shannon, A Proposal for the Dartmouth Summer Research Project on 
Artifi cial Intelligence http://jmc.stanford.edu/articles/dartmouth/dartmouth.pdf (accessed 
20.04.2021): ‘every aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can in principle be so 
precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate it’; A. Turing, Computing Machinery 
and Intelligence, “Mind” 1950, vol. 49, no. 236, p. 433, https://www.cse-e.umbc.edu/courses/471/
papers/turing.pdf (accessed 20.04.2021); Collins Dictionary: “Artifi cial intelligence is a type of 
computer technology which is concerned with making machines work in an intelligent way, 
similar to the way that the human mind works”; Merriam-Webster Dictionary: “the capability 
of a machine to imitate intelligent human behaviour”; Communication from the Commission, 
op. cit.; HLEG AI Defi nition 2018: Th e European Commission’s high-level expert group on 
artifi cial intelligence, A defi nition of AI: Main capabilities and scientifi c disciplines. Defi nition 
developed for the purpose of the deliverables of the High-Level Expert Group on AI, Brussels, 
18.12.2018, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/defi nition-artifi cial-intelligence-
main-capabilities-and-scientifi c-disciplines. See also the defi nition from May 2019 in the 
Recommendation of the Council on Artifi cial Intelligence, OECD, https://legalinstruments.oecd.
org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0449.
19 For more, see: T. Zalewski, Defi nicja sztucznej inteligencji, (in:) L. Lai and M. Swierczyński (eds.), 
Prawo Sztucznej Inteligencji, op. cit., pp. 11–12.
20 For more about AI learning, see: M. Tegmark, Życie 3.0. Człowiek w Erze sztucznej Inteligencji, 
Warsaw 2019, p. 111ff .
21 Th is is not the fi rst such postulation in scholarship. In 2018, such a need was pointed out by 
K. Werbach, in Th e Blockchain and the New Architecture of Trust, London 2018, pp. 1–7.
22 L. Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace, New York 1999, p. 3ff .
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executed by them.23 Such a process is carried out without the transcription of 
a computer code into symbols, letters, words, phrases and sentences, in a manner 
that cannot be directly perceived by humans.24 A legal provision or a contract 
starts to operate as a computer program and not as a text including legal provisions 
composed of letters and grammatical characters presented in natural language.25 Law 
and technology interact26 with each other increasingly intensively through a complex 
system of relations and correlations, as both of them contribute to the regulation of 
the behaviour of entities such as individuals, where the law regulates such behaviour 
as the system of orders and prohibitions, while the programming codes regulate the 
actual restrictions27 on the freedom of those who use it in cyberspace.28 Th us far, the 
codes have mainly restricted the freedom of people operating in cyberspace. Why can 
they not restrict other codes, such as AI? Code is the architecture of cyberspace, and 
pieces of code are the construction material of such architecture. Everything we see 
online is delivered through a code; only a code can allow the presence of social rules 
in cyberspace. Th us, the code also functions as a regulator.29 
Th e functions of codes in cyberspace are described in a similar manner by 
Lessig. He claims that cyberspace is not entirely a zone of full liberty but is regulated. 
Th e author states that ‘Th is regulator is code – the soft ware and hardware that 
make cyberspace as it is. Th is code, or architecture, sets the terms on which life in 
cyberspace is experienced. It determines how easy it is to protect privacy, or how 
easy it is to censor speech. It determines whether access to information is general 
23 See: M. Araszkiewicz, Algorytmizacja myślenia prawniczego. Model, możliwości ograniczenia, 
(in:) D. Szostek (ed.), Legal Tech, op. cit., p. 55ff .
24 Attention was drawn to it in the literature as early as 2002; see: A.  Wiebe, Die elektronische 
Willenserklärung, Tubingen 2002, p. 350; D.  Szostek, Czynność prawna a środki komunikacji 
elektronicznej, Krakow 2004, p. 39. See also: W. Cyrul, LegalTech a tworzenie i publikacja tekstów 
prawnych, (in:) D. Szostek (ed.), Legal Tech, op. cit., p. 88ff .
25 More on the transcription of spoken language into algorithmic codes is in: M.  Araszkiewicz, 
Algorytmizacja, op. cit., p. 55.
26 An example includes the analysis of the correct implementation of 42 directives in Ireland, 
Luxembourg and Italy performed by an expert system; see: R. Nanda, G. Siragusa, L. Di Caro, 
G.  Boella, L.  Grossio, M.  Gerbaudo and F.  Costamanga, Unsupervised and Supervised Text 
Similarity Systems for Automated Identifi cation of National Implementing Measures of European 
Directives, “Artifi cial Intelligence and Law” 2019, vol. 27, p. 1999ff . Also see: R. Boulet, P. Mazzega 
and D. Bourcier, Network Approach to the French System of Legal Codes, part II: Th e Role of the 
Weights in a Network, “Artifi cial Intelligence and Law” 2018, vol. 26, p. 23ff .
27 Th e transformation of law into programming codes is a new scientifi c discipline which combines 
law and computer science and thus creates so-called LegalTech. See: S.  Schrebak, Integrating 
Computer Science into Legal Discipline: Th e Rise of Legal Programming, pp. 1–33, https://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=2496094 (accessed 22.09.2019); M. Corrales, M. Fenwick 
and H. Haapio, Legal Tech, Smart Contracts and Blockchain, Singapore 2019, p. 5ff .
28 W.  Szpringer, Blockchain jako innowacja systemowa. Od Internetu informacji do Internetu 
wartości, Warsaw 2018, p. 40.
29 S. Schrebak, Integrating Computer Science, op. cit., p. 4.
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or whether information is zoned. It aff ects who sees what, or what is monitored and 
invisible. Code regulates cyberspace in ways that one cannot begin to see unless one 
begins to understand the nature of this code. Th e code of cyberspace is changing. And 
as this code changes, the character of cyberspace will change as well.’30 G. Wood puts 
it similarly in his work, indicating that cryptography makes it possible to implement 
law into codes. In the terms of his concept, crypto-law is characterised by the fact 
that it is possible to implement legal rules known from traditional law into codes 
in a highly secured cryptographic space. Th e moment when this became possible 
is the development of blockchain technology.31 A similar possibility is indicated by 
M.  Hildebrand, who asks to what extent algorithmic regulation could replace or 
support legal regulation.32
Cyberspace is an artifi cial creation operating through soft ware.33 AI is an 
algorithmic code constituting an element of cyberspace, and therefore it could be 
regulated through the same technique, that is, through the codes with legal regulations 
implemented into them. Cyberspace is dynamic and undergoes continuous changes. 
AI is also dynamic and undergoes continuous changes, and therefore the method of 
regulation should also be subject to dynamism,34 to appropriately adapt to changing 
social relations35 and take into account diff erent spaces and legal systems. In other 
words, the process of AI teaching or AI learning should take into account the legal 
restrictions imposed on it, which may be achieved either through appropriately 
created data ecosystems or through appropriate algorithms with legal regulations 
(restrictions) for AI implemented into them. 
30 L. Lessig, Code is Law: On Liberty in Cyberspace, “Harvard Magazine”, https://harvardmagazine.
com/2000/ 01/code-is-law-html (accessed 19.04.2021).
31 G. Wood, Ethereum: A Secure Decentralized Generalized Transaction Ledger (EIP-150 revision), 
http://gavwood.com/Paper.pdf (accessed 19.07.2021), See: also R.  Prabucki, D.  Szostek and 
J. Wyczik, Prawo jako kod, op. cit., p. 23; Compare M. Hildebrandt, Smart Technologies and the 
End(s) of Law, Northampton 2016, p. 1ff .
32 M.  Hildebrandt, Algorithmic Regulation and the Rule of Law, ‘Philosophical Transactions of 
the Royal Society A’ 2018, vol. 376, issue 2128, https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/10.1098/
rsta.2017.0355 (accessed 19.07.2021).
33 L. Lessig, Code and Other Laws, op. cit., p. 82.
34 M. Fenwick, E.P.M. Vermeulen and M. Corrales, Business and Regulatory Responses to Artifi cial 
Intelligence: Dynamic Regulation, Innovation Ecosystems and the Strategic Management of 
Disruptive Technology, (in:) M. Corrales, M. Fenwick and Nikolaus Forgó (eds.), Robotics, AI 
and the Future of Law, Singapore 2018, p. 88.
35 Compare J.P. Aires, D. Pinheiro, V. Strube de Lima and F. Meneguzzi, Norm Confl ict Identifi cation 
in Contracts, “Artifi cial Intelligence and Law” 2017, vol. 25, p. 397ff . 
50
Dariusz Szostek
Bialystok Legal Studies 2021 vol. 26 nr 3
Białostockie Studia Prawnicze
2. Algorithms as an AI Regulation Tool? 
Th e dynamism36 of AI regulation cannot be correctly dealt with only by traditional 
legislation published in a natural language. Yet a regulation algorithm may facilitate 
it. Pursuant to the guidelines included in ‘A White Paper on Artifi cial Intelligence – 
A European approach to excellence and trust’ (COM(2020) 65 fi nal) and also with the 
AI Act, AI should be characterised by transparency and accountability, and a solid 
regulatory framework protects EU citizens and helps create the European market 
for AI.37 Th e regulation algorithm may constitute a relevant tool which guarantees 
transparency, accountability and appropriate dynamism. 
Th e basic feature which distinguishes AI from other algorithms is its possibility 
to learn by itself in a rational manner.38 AI systems can be designed to learn to adapt 
their behaviour by analysing how the environment is aff ected by their previous 
actions.39 Th erefore, there are no obstacles to AI learning the imposed rules, orders 
and prohibitions which are basic paradigms for it, implemented into algorithmic 
codes40 which have been earlier prepared by humans. 
36 M.  Fenwick, E.P.M.  Vermeulen and M.  Corrales, Business and Regulatory Responses, op. cit., 
p. 88.
37 It is worth noting the report of Prof. C.H. Wendehorst prepared for the European Commission: 
Safety and Liability Related Aspect of Soft ware (June 2021), which points to a broader need for 
algorithmic regulation, not only in the AI Act; https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/
study-safety-and-liability-related-aspects-soft ware (accessed 20.07.2021). For more about 
this and the substantive scope of the legislation, see: https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/fi les/
commission-white-paper-artifi cial-intelligence-feb2020_en.pdf (accessed 09.04.2021).
38 Defi nition based on the concept by Marvin Minsky, an AI pioneer, in Perceptrons: M. Minsky, 
Perceptrons: An Introduction to Computational Geometry, Massachusetts 1969, p. 7ff . See also 
his: M. Minsky, Th e Emotion Machine. Commonsense Th inking, Artifi cial Intelligence, and the 
Future of the Human Mind, New York/London/Toronto/Sydney 2007, p. 6ff .; M. Yao, M. Jia and 
A. Zhou, Applied Artifi cial Intelligence. A Handbook for Business Leaders, Middletown 2018, 
p. 8; S.  Finlay, Artifi cial Intelligence and Machine Learning for Business, Great Britain 2018, 
pp. 6–28.
39 Compare other reports: Centre for Information Policy Leadership, Artifi cial Intelligence and 
Data Protection: Delivering Sustainable AI Accountability in Practice. First Report: Artifi cial 
Intelligence and Data Protection in Tension, 01.11.2018, https://www.informationpolicycentre.com/
uploads/5/7/1/0/57104281/cipl_ai_first_report_-_artificial_intelligence_and_data_protection_
in_te....pdf (accessed 06.02.2019); Interpol Innovation Centre, Singapore, Innovation Report 
Artifi cial Intelligence, https://media.licdn.com/dms/document/C4E1FAQHbu EqCSHEUsQ/
feedshare-document-pdf-analyzed/0?e=1549350000&v=beta&t=lpYHjU3SizFf82swBk3g33TLFq 
WGRy8EjbKyhLPsST0 (accessed 07.04.2021). 
40 G. Governatori, F. Idelberger, Z. Milosevic, R. Riveret, G. Sartor and X. Xu, On Legal Contracts, 
Imperative and Declarative Smart Contracts, and Blockchain Systems, “Artifi cial Intelligence and 
Law” 2018, vol. 26, p. 398. Th e authors name a smart contract as a law-regulating tool. In view of 
this article, the author refers – in a broader manner – not so much to the very notion of a smart 
contract as to the algorithm that creates it. 
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Th e creation of a correctly operating regulation algorithm, or many such 
algorithms, requires the identifi cation of functional interactions between diff erent 
elements, and as they change depending on the context,41 it becomes necessary to 
create the environment allowing for the measurement of the system’s performance.42 
Th e development of a regulation algorithm requires the information which enables 
algorithms to make conscious decisions (prohibitions and orders). Th e quality of 
the provided information should be measured by such attributes as whether the 
information is essential, appropriate, understandable, searchable and well-archived. 
Such indicators are not easily quantifi able, but they are very signifi cant.43 
Th e regulation algorithm may be constructed on the data recorded in the 
available repositories based – for example – on blockchain,44 which would ensure 
the reliability of recording and its unchangeability, and thus transparency and 
accountability,45 and in practice, the proof that the data transferred to AI is correct. 
What is important is that blockchain technology has already become very well known 
and has been well described, and in relation to which legal regulations have been 
implemented in many countries, of which the legal presumptions of the truth of the 
facts is recorded in blockchain. In the eIDADS 2 project, the European Commission 
proposes to link the legal presumption to the entry of data in a qualifi ed electronic 
register maintained by a qualifi ed certifi cation service provider46 (which could be 
a blockchain). Th is is not an isolated idea. Individual countries are introducing this 
type of solution, and the EU proposal is more like trying to catch up. Appropriate 
adjustments include the proceedings to take evidence concerning the data recorded 
in blockchain, as well as (for example in Malta, New York state and Singapore) the 
implementation of regulations concerning the control of codes and systems based on 
blockchain,47 which may be easily expanded to cover the control of AI. 
Both input and output data should be readable (perceptible) by human beings 
(in spite of the fact that the algorithmic regulator should be recognisable fi rst of all by 
AI), which – in compliance with the experts’ guidelines – would enable the control 
of the AI teaching or self-learning process. Th e repository layer should be composed 
of codifi ed templates, clauses and libraries which should be accessible by AI through 
41 Compare ibidem, p. 394ff . 
42 Th e possibility of utilising regulatory sandboxes is indicated by M. Fenwick, E.P.M. Vermeulen 
and M. Corrales, Business and Regulatory Responses, op. cit., p. 89.
43 T.D. Barton, H. Haapio, S. Passera and J.G. Hazard, Successful Contracts: Integrating Design and 
Technology, (in:) M. Corrales, M. Fenwick and N. Forgó (eds.), Robotics, op. cit., p. 77ff .
44 K. Werbach, Th e Blockchain and the New Architecture of Trust, op. cit., pp. 1–7.
45 M. Hildebrandt, Algorithmic Regulation, op. cit., passim. 
46 eIDAS Regulation, https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/eidas-regulation (accessed 
15.07.2021).
47 For more, see: D.  Szostek, Blockchain and Law, Baden-Baden 2019, p. 5ff . and the literature 
specifi ed therein. 
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an interface but – at the same time – possible to be submitted to experts (humans) for 
their verifi cation or control, also in the form of the text in natural language.48 
3. Legislator or Private Entity as AI Regulation Algorithm Creator? 
Although the concepts for creating a uniform and autonomous law for 
cyberspace49 have been suggested for a number of years, their implementation seems 
to be distant, in spite of the fact that it would signifi cantly facilitate AI regulation. 
Th e concept of a separate law for cyberspace is mainly focused on the elimination of 
the doubts concerning jurisdiction and governing law, as well as the distribution and 
fl ow of goods in the digital world.50 Th ere are diff erent suggestions – from viewing 
cyberspace as an international space,51 through cyberspace, as an exterritorial area, 
being the shared property of all states, to the so-called lex electronica.52 At present, 
none of these concepts seems to be possible to implement. Th erefore, a regulator based 
on algorithmic code currently seems to be the most viable solution, all the more so 
because it can operate at diff erent legislation levels, as well as being able to be created 
both by public and government bodies and by private entities (as a LegalTech). It can 
also be connected with a specifi c territory (e.g. the EU, individual states).
Having accepted and taken into account the guidelines of the ‘White Paper 
for AI’, soft ware providers will have to create relevant data ecosystems or private 
regulation algorithms which are subject to ex-post control in case of damage caused 
by AI.53 However, a question arises about whether private entities should be the only 
ones that should create such systems or regulation algorithms. Is it not worthwhile 
thinking about – when the opportunity arises in connection with AI regulation – the 
broader implementation of law into algorithmic codes at the level of the European 
Community and individual Member States? Should the EU legislator limit only the 
48 M. Araszkiewicz, Algorytmizacja, op. cit., p. 55ff .; W. Cyrul, LegalTech, op. cit., p. 88ff .
49 Such a concept is supported by D.R. Johnson and D. Post, Law and Borders: Th e Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace, ‘Stanford Law Review’ 1996, vol. 48, no. 5. 
50 J. Kulesza, Międzynarodowe prawo Internetu, Poznań 2010, p. 291. 
51 D.C.  Menthe, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: A Th eory of International Spaces, ‘Michigan 
Telecommunications and Technology Law Review’ 1998, no. 69, pp. 69‒103.
52 P. Trudel, La lex electronica, (in:) C.A. Morand (ed.), Le droit saisi par la mondialisation, Brussels 
2001, p. 221; V. Gautrais, Lex Electronica: d’aujourd’hiu a demain, ‘Lex Electronica’ 2016, http://
www.lex-electronica.org/articles/volume-21/lex-electronica-daujourdhui-a-demain/ (accessed 
21.07.2019). Th e issue of lex electronica is also discussed by L.  Railas in Th e Rise of the Lex 
Electronica and the International Sale of Goods, Helsinki 2004, p. 500ff . 
53 Attention should be paid to the suggestion included in ‘A White Paper for AI’ concerning the 
requirements for said application.
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regulations created and published in a natural language, with the use of RegTech54 
tools as a technological support for traditional regulation at the most? 
In the author’s opinion, the issue of AI regulation is an excellent opportunity 
to use RegTech in the legislative process of the European Union, and even further, 
to establish law implemented into algorithm. Th e introduction of regulation 
algorithms for AI at the level of the Community, and created by the Community as 
the obligatory law, will contribute to the development of AI in the EU, and thus to the 
cybereconomy. It will be an element supporting small and medium-sized enterprises 
which – unlike big enterprises – cannot aff ord costly regulation algorithms. It would 
also decrease expenditure – once created, a regulation algorithm would be used by 
many enterprises and other entities of the European Union. It will also contribute 
to the unifi cation of regulation throughout the Community, and thus the reliability 
of law. Legislation published only in natural language will not provide such benefi ts. 
What is important is that it is not necessary to create the entire legal system in codes 
for AI at once. It could be started with the creation of legislative ‘puzzles’ referring to 
individual spheres which are then slowly interconnected, both horizontally (that is, 
as individual regulation algorithms of diff erent branches of EU law) and vertically 
(EU law, national law, local law, etc.). 
Th e current discipline of law shows the territorial, personal and temporary 
scope of the application of legal provisions. AI regulation algorithms under the legal 
system implemented into codes may take into account those scopes being the same 
external source of regulation55 for AI ecosystems. For just as humans have to observe 
the provisions according to their hierarchy or the territory of their applicability, it 
is possible to similarly develop an algorithmic regulator taking into account the 
nature of such provisions. To put it in diff erent words, the AI regulation should be of 
a cascading nature. 
In the author’s opinion, the adoption and implementation of an international 
convention56 referring to artifi cial intelligence is required, which would become 
the grounds for implementing a technologised code-based AI operator and for 
introducing such restricting codes,57 and enforcing consideration of the AI regulator 
54 More on the conceptual scope of LegalTech, RegTech and others is in: D. Szostek (ed.), Legal Tech, 
op. cit., pp. 7–9. 
55 It is one of the elements of the divisions of smart contracts. D.  Szostek, Blockchain and Law, 
op. cit., p. 122. 
56 Activities concerning the creation of such a convention have been undertaken by the Council of 
Europe, yet it will take time to achieve results. 
57 Th e discussion of AI regulation refers – quite seriously – to Asimov’s Robotics Laws as the 
elements of such regulation: 1. A robot may not injure a human or, through inaction, allow 
a human to come to harm; 2. A robot must obey the orders given to it by humans except where 
such orders would confl ict with the First Law; 3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as 
such protection does not confl ict with the First or Second Laws. Th e First Law is the answer in the 
discussion concerning AI and wartime law. 
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in AI ecosystems. It should be assumed that a convention will be concluded and 
published in natural language in compliance with the requirements of public 
international law. 
Regardless of the international convention, the European Union is preparing its 
own EU legislation in natural language, which regulates AI.58 It is worthwhile thinking 
about the parallel preparation of the algorithm; depending on the will of the EU, it 
could take diff erent forms. Th e optimum solution would be that such an algorithm 
is the eff ective law and not only a technological tool supporting the regulation 
(RegTech). Yet it would require signifi cant changes in the understanding of EU law 
and legislation. However, it would contribute to the unifi cation of restrictions for AI 
and the reliability of law in the territory of the EU. Th e last level should include the 
national regulation algorithms under the scope of local legislation as a supplement to 
the EU regulator. Th is would be a major step into the future and would infl uence the 
development of the European digital economy. 
 Such a process would require the commitment of numerous entities on diff erent 
levels and with signifi cant outlays, but is possible to implement. However, it requires 
a diff erent perception of law. A lawyer gains education which enables them to fi nd 
their way through an impenetrable maze of regulations through many years of work 
(studies and then legal training). An algorithm would have to be educated in a similar 
way. Th us the creation of a regulatory system based on algorithms will be very 
complex, costly and time consuming during the fi rst stage. With time, such a system 
should become increasingly eff ective and less costly. It can be started with small 
sections of law and gradually expanded. Th e AI regulation is a good opportunity 
to make such an eff ort, at the level of both scientifi c research and implementation. 
Another solution is to create a single Community RegTech tool (as an integral 
part of the AI Act) to support AI auditability, especially since, according to the AI 
Act proposal, there are going to be entities auditing and certifying algorithms at 
national levels anyway, or as private entities, which will have to create appropriate 
technological tools (and thus RegTech) to meet the requirements of the proposed 
act. Instead of multiple, dispersed algorithms, used by a number of diff erent entities, 
including private ones, when auditing AI, how about a single community tool?
4. Yet It Is Not Th at Simple
Th e concept of algorithmic code as an AI regulator presented above may seem 
futuristic. Yet given the fact that, at present, many activities are concluded and 
enforced with the use of smart contracts, with complex agreements, and of which 
some have already been supported by AI or machine learning-based algorithms, may 
58 Th ese include the above-mentioned AI Act.
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it be that it is still possible to implement such a concept? Th e algorithm perfectly 
regulates private law (agreements and smart contracts), so why should it not be 
expanded to legislation?59 However, many questions and doubts arise,60 and also 
issues requiring further research. 
Firstly, how can the entities utilising AI be obligated to connect their ecosystems 
to the regulation algorithm? How should such a system be developed? What 
paradigms should be assumed for AI? Which norms and rules should be taken into 
account? Only the international ones, or also local, imperative or dispositive ones? 
How should competition and freedom of economic activity be guaranteed? Th ere are 
issues such as the assessment of values such as liberalism and freedom in cyberspace, 
and the regulations restricting them; diff erences in legal systems and cultural 
diff erences; ethical issues and their diversifi cation in diff erent cultures; whether 
the law of nature, ethics, and moral law should be taken into account;61 the issue of 
identifi cation of entities on the Internet;62 the issue of identifi cation of legal systems 
applicable to a given act (AI and private international law); whether and to what 
extent precedents and soft  law should be taken into account and weighted; whether 
soft  law such as ISO standards and others should be included; who should control 
the system, in what ways, and what the consequences of violation should be; how to 
prevent cyberattacks; who should control code and those who write codes, how, and 
who should control the controllers; what should happen when a law is violated or 
codes are changed. Such questions may proliferate.63 
Conclusion
Th is article is just a contribution to the discussion, focused not so much on 
the scope as on the technical manner of artifi cial intelligence regulation. In the 
author’s opinion, when the opportunity arises in connection with AI regulation, 
it is worthwhile tackling the new perspective on legislation, as law implemented 
into code (algorithm) but also enforced by algorithm. It seems that the hypothesis 
concerning AI regulation through regulation algorithms is justifi ed as to its substance 
and – signifi cantly – as to practice. However, it requires a change of approach to law 
59 Such scientifi c attempts are already being made; see: M. Araszkiewicz, Algorytmizacja, op. cit., 
p. 55.
60 Th e issue of diffi  culties with the utilisation of databases in expert systems is dealt with in M. Badiul 
Islam and G.  Governatori, RuleRS: A Rule-Based Architecture for Decision Support Systems, 
‘Artifi cial Intelligence and Law’ 2018, vol. 26, p. 7.
61 C. Magnusson Sjöberg, Legal Automation, AI and Law Revisited, (in:) M. Corrales, M. Fenwick 
and H. Haapio, Legal Tech, op. cit., p. 172.
62 L. Lessig, Code and, op. cit., p. 30, 54. 
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and the tradition related thereto. We should consider negatively the concept of the 
exclusivity of an algorithm as the regulator, without the possibility of verifi cation 
of law in natural language. Both input and output data should be subject to control 
by a human being in a manner which is at least indirect (the transcription of codes 
into natural language), which is in compliance with the AI Act. In other words, the 
regulation algorithm should operate as a hybrid of the code with the possibility of 
transcription into natural language. In the author’s opinion, the regulation algorithm 
should be the law and not only a LegalTech tool supporting the regulations, created 
but mainly published as law by relevant authorities of the EU. Th is vision is bold, yet 
not impossible. As a fi nal option, it could be a unifi ed community RegTech tool.
We have a chance for the solution to provide an opportunity for the development 
of the cybereconomy and greater effi  ciency. It is worthwhile starting discussion in 
that regard and to continue scientifi c research. At the moment, talks and research 
on an AI regulatory algorithm for Polish state systems are already conducted at the 
national level in the NASK. Similar work is conducted by other EU countries. In 
order for this work not to be duplicated, it is worth transferring it to the level of the 
whole EU.
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